PHI 030
May 20, 2015
Carl A. Matheson and A. David Kline
Is There a Significant Observational-Theoretical Distinction?
One section (and then paragraph) at a time
Starting with the Conclusion
- The Observational/Theoretical (OT) division has not achieved what it set out to achieve (¶ 66)
- All the difficulties of unobservables, e.g., do they exist and how do we know, now plague observables, too (¶ 67)
- Observation statements may not even be more reliable or easily known than other kinds (¶ 68)
Argument Outline
Introduction: ¶ 1, 2(I) ¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
(II) ¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
(III) ¶ 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
(IV) ¶ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
(V) ¶ 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
Conclusion ¶ 66, 67, 68
Introduction
¶ 1 | outline
Philosophy of science has been preoccupied with two-tiered conceptions of scientific theories, such as Carnap's, which have been largely discredited, but which drive debates about scientific progress and realism/anti-realism.
"Twentieth-century philosophy of science..." (p. 374)
Argument Outline
Introduction: ¶ 1, 2(I) ¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
(II) ¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
(III) ¶ 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
(IV) ¶ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
(V) ¶ 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
Conclusion ¶ 66, 67, 68
¶ 2 | outline
The observational/theoretical distinction is the heart of these two-tiered views, and Matheson and Kline (MK) want to know (1) what led to the demise of this view, and (2) how the distinction created debates over realism and anti-realism.
"At the quick of..." (p. 374)
Argument Outline
Introduction: ¶ 1, 2(I) ¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
(II) ¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
(III) ¶ 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
(IV) ¶ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
(V) ¶ 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
Conclusion ¶ 66, 67, 68
I. Motivation for Two-Tier Philosophy
I. Section Summary
The observable/unobservable distinction was motivated by (1) a desire to have meaningful, empirically testable statements by which to judge scientific claims, and (2) by the belief that observation statements would make it possible to compare competing theories.
Click Down for paragraph summaries. Click Right to move to next section.
¶ 3 | outline
The two-tier view assumes that observational terms such as "desk" and "brown" are importantly different from theoretical terms such as "electron" or "gene," though no satisfactory criteria have been given to mark the distinction.
"Defenders of the two-tier..." (p. 374)
¶ 4 | outline
MK quote Carl Hempel's view which avails itself of the notion of direct observation in suitable circumstances.
"In regard to an..." (p. 375)
¶ 5 | outline
It isn't clear what the suitable circumstances need to be for direct observation to be possible, but the fact that philosophers have neglected to settle the issues is a sign, think MK, that the issue that must be figured out is how observational terms related to theoretical ones.
"What are 'suitable' circumstances..." (p. 375)
¶ 6 | outline
MK give a nonsense example that purports to explain water cooling in terms of "glubbification" to illustrate why meaningless terms have no place in science, which was the strongly held view of, e.g., Carnap and Popper.
"The explanans of adequate..." (p. 375)
¶ 7 | outline
MK quote the 18th century philosopher George Berkeley who accused physicists of his day of using nonsense/meaningless expressions such as 'solicitation of gravity, urge, dead forces, etc'.
"In works on motion..." (p. 375)
¶ 8 | outline
MK ask whether contemporary physics and psychology are similarly falling into meaninglessness by using theoretical terms such as "charm and attenuators."
"Without being so arrogant..." (p. 375)
¶ 9 | outline
Logical empiricists (the two-tier philosophers) have clear criteria for marking off "cognitively significant" statements (which can be either true or false) from nonsense statements, namely, a sentence must be either (1) true by definition (A = A) or a contradiction (A != A), or (2) the sentence must be testable via some kind of observable evidence.
"Logical empiricism provides a..." (p. 376)
¶ 10 | outline
In order for theoretical sentences to be meaningful, they must be testable in some way, which is what Carnap et al. were trying to make possible by translated unobservables (not testable) into observables (testable).
"Notice that the empiricist..." (p. 376)
¶ 11 | outline
Two-tier philosophers were also motivated by having some way to compare theories, which is only possible if there is some independent means of testing them, something that observation sentences make possible.
"Another motivation concerns providing..." (p. 376)
II. How the Observable/Unobservable Distinction Created the Realism/Anti-realism Debate
II. Section Summary
Attempts to specify the relation between observation statements and theoretical statements has created a vast realism/anti-realism debate that directly encourages instrumentalist views.
¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
Click Down for paragraph summaries. Click Right to move to next section.
¶ 12 | outline
Since the "traditional conception of theories is to specify the meaning of the theoretical in terms of the observational vocabulary," the main task is to explain the relation (R) between observation terms (e.g., brown, desk, etc.) and theoretical terms (e.g., electron, gene, etc.)
"As we saw in..." (p. 376)
¶ 13 | outline
One way to specify R is by an explicit definition that tells you how to apply a theoretical term in observation terms, e.g., "Someone is in love if and only if they feel (initially) woozy in the presence of the object of their affection."
"Consider a theoretical term..." (p. 377)
¶ 14 | outline
MK give a common sense definition of realism, which holds that (i) theoretical sentences are either true or false, and (ii) theoretical terms can refer to unobservables.
"REALISM: (1) Theoretical sentences..." (p. 377)
¶ 15 | outline
While theories with explicit definitions contain sentences that are either true or false, they do not refer to unobservables, which makes such theories anti-realist (and reductionist).
"If we ask whether..." (p. 377)
¶ 16 | outline
Explaining the relation (R) between observables and unobservables in terms of explicit definitions runs afoul of standard logic. (How so? . . . )
"There are two fundamental..." (p. 377)
¶ 17 | outline
Another problem is that if another explicit definition is needed for love, e.g., "Someone is in love if and only if they care more for their beloved than for themselves," then we will end up with a profusion of theoretical concepts.
"Secondly, if additional explicit..." (p. 377)
¶ 18 | outline
Instead of explicit definitions, we can give partial definitions, which drop the necessary condition component, e.g., "If someone cares more for their beloved than themselves, then they are in love," so that each new definition doesn't created a new concept.
"Given the above criticisms..." (p. 378)
¶ 19 | outline
The partial definition view is compatible with instrumentalism (an anti-realism) and realism.
"What commitment to unobserved..." (p. 378)
¶ 20 | outline
MK define metaphysical instrumentalism as a view that (i) theoretical sentences are not true or false; (ii) theoretical terms cannot refer to unobservables; and (iii) theories are algorithms for making predictions.
"METAPHYSICAL INSTRUMENTALISM: (i) Theoretical..." (p. 378)
¶ 21 | outline
Instrumentalists believe that theories are not true or false, but rather good/useful or bad/useless.
"On an instrumentalist interpretation..." (p. 378)
¶ 22 | outline
Instrumentalism is also motivated by the fact that scientific concepts are often highly idealized, i.e., unrealistic, and that incompatible theories can be used to describe the same subject, e.g., Newton's laws and Einstein's laws and incompatible but they give the same answers to lots of problems in physics.
"Instrumentalism, it is thought..." (p. 378)
¶ 23 | outline
MK claim that specifying the relation between observation terms and theoretical terms via partial definitions encourages instrumentalism, i.e., instrumentalism is a result of the two-tier philosophers.
"Despite the received wisdom..." (p. 378)
¶ 24 | outline
The realism/anti-realism debate is a consequence of attempts by, e.g., Carnap to specify R.
"There are difficulties with..." (p. 379)
III. Why Rationally Choosing Theories May Be Impossible
III. Section Summary
The theory-ladenness of observations has revealed the possibility that it may be impossible to rationally compare scientific theories.
¶ 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46
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¶ 25 | outline
MK look at critiques of the observational-theoretical (OT) dichotomy, one of which criticizes Carnap for using the term "observe" in a manner different from scientists, but MK don't find the criticism persusavie since he (Carnap) didn't think departing from ordinary scientific usage was a problem.
"We want to turn..." (p. 379)
¶ 26 | outline
Another criticism of the OT dichotomy involves taking a particular way that someone has suggested drawing the distinction and showing that it doesn't divide up science in the intended way, i.e., the wrongs things end up being counted as observable and unobservable.
"The second type of..." (p. 379)
¶ 27 | outline
MK don't consider these critiques decisive.
"There is a considerable..." (p. 379)
¶ 28 | outline
MK propose to attack the motivation for the OT distinction, and one of the motivations was the belief that claims about observational objects are more "epistemically transparent," i.e., we can know when we are making true claims about easily observable things such as chairs."It should be immediately..." (p. 380)
"Rather than repeat specific..." (p. 380)
¶ 29 | outline
However, a little reflection convinces us that our knowledge of observable entities is by no means certain (epistemically transparent) since we are often wrong about, e.g., whether an animal is a dog or a wolf, or a cat or a racoon.
"It should be immediately..." (p. 380)
¶ 30 | outline
Phenomenalists (or as MK call them "sense-datum theorists") think that what we observe aren't objects in the world but sensory perceptions in our heads, and so our observation statements are just (sense-datum) reports of what is in our heads.
"According to proponents of..." (p 380)
¶ 31 | outline
Phenomenalists claims that while we can be wrong about our descriptions of the outside world, e.g., reporting that a cat is raiding our trash cans when racoons are really the culprit, we can't be wrong about our sense-datum reports since they are just reports of what we are experiencing.
"The proponents of sense-datum..." (p. 380)
¶ 32 | outline
This phenomenalist picture of the world isn't particularly consistent with how scientists view and talk about the world, but it does seem to provide the certainty (epistemical transparency) that the OT proponents were after.
"Sense-datum reports, of..." (p. 380)
¶ 33 | outline
However, MK assert that no one has been able to figure out how to translate sense-data claims about perceptual experience into claims about ordinary objects.
"Unfortunately matters have not..." (p. 380)
¶ 34 | outline
An even greater problem with the phenomenalist view is that reports of own perceptual experience are not in fact certain because they rely on interpreting the experience and error is always possible when interpretation comes into play.
"But there is a ..." (p. 381)
¶ 35 | outline
The OB distinction is based on the assumption that we can know things about observable objects with certainty, but that turns out not to be true.
"The observational-theoretical distinction..." (p. 381)
¶ 36 | outline
The final motivation for the OB distinction is that it is supposed to give us an independent way to compare theories.
"Let us examine the..." (p. 381)
¶ 37 | outline
The assumption is that ordinary observations would provide a theory-neutral way, i.e., a way that doesn't use terms for unobservables such as atom and gene, but MK believe that Hanson has demonstrated conclusively that all observation is theory-laden.
"Observation is alleged to..." (p. 381)
¶ 38 | outline
MK explain Hanson's claims, which you have read and are familiar with.
"Hanson has a number..." (p. 382)
¶ 39 | outline
Hanson shows a dilemma: Either seeing is essentially a sensory experience, in which case it is irrelevant to science; or seeing is theory-laden, which makes it relevant to science but unable to provide a neutral ground from which to judge theories
"Yet these sort of" (p. 382)
¶ 40 | outline
Hanson considers the first option of the dilemma, and observes that physiological states (sense-datum) are irrelevant to scientific theories because they aren't the sort of thing that can be true or false.
"Let's consider the horns..." (p. 382)
¶ 41 | outline
MK rehash Hanson's point that seeing (observing) something is always seeing it (observing it) as something, and that depends on our theories, i.e., there is no theory-neutral seeing.
"Turning to the second..." (p. 382)
¶ 42 | outline
MK conclude that Hanson's arguments are decisive, which means that the motivations for the OT distinction—using certain observation terms to help establish the truth of theoretical terms and using theory-neutral observation terms as a neutral way to compare theories—cannot be achieved.
"We believe that Hanson's..." (p. 382)
¶ 43 | outline
MK ask whether it might still be possible to rationally compare theories even though observation is theory-laden.
"A serious question remains..." (p. 382)
¶ 44 | outline
MK consider the possibility that different theories might contain observational subtheories (or modules) that can be compared, which would make theory comparison an option in at least some cases.
"For instance, the fact..." (p. 383)
¶ 45 | outline
MK cite philosophers, such as Feyerabend, who claim that the meanings of the terms in a theory are defined holistically, i.e., they are interdependent, so when a theory changes the meaning of, say, mass, all of the other terms in the theory change as well, which make theory comparison impossible because there can be no comparable subtheories.
"However, according to certain" (p. 383)
¶ 46 | outline
MK conclude that it appears as though selecting scientific theories by an objective and rational process looks impossible.
"Both (i) and (ii)..." (p. 384)
IV. How Realism/Anti-Realism Debates Have Been Fueled by a Failure of the Observable/Theoretical (OT) Distinction
IV. Section Summary
Theory-ladenness also has potential impacts on debates about whether we can know anything about the world at all, raising the specters of relativism, skepticism, and conventionalism.
¶ 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
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¶ 47 | outline
MK assert that Hanson has shown that we now have "absolutely no motivation remaining for worrying about unobservable objects ad theoretical statements" since they can't do the work OT philosophers had hoped, and this might have an effect on the realism/anti-realism debate.
"Do Hanson's claims also..." (p. 384)
¶ 48 | outline
Finding out that observation terms are just as uncertain as theoretical terms allows realists to claim a win, because everything is on equally uncertain footing and we have no reason to believe that we can know about one kind of thing and not another.
"It may seem that.." (p. 384)
¶ 49 | outline
Hanson's view might even lead to relativism, which holds that there is no one truth, but only truth relative to some particular theoretical framework.
"Hanson's arguments add some..." (p. 385)
¶ 50 | outline
Relativism presupposes that we can (in some sense) find out the truth, however if truth isn't discoverable, then we face skepticism, which is the view that our rational practices, e.g., science can't take us toward truth.
"Relativism is plausible as ..." (p. 385)
¶ 51 | outline
If we can't rationally pick one theory rather than another (because of theory-ladenness), then the idea of truth doesn't help because we can never get there, which would radically change our picture of science.
"Since there are rationally..." (p. 385)
¶ 52 | outline
Even if we adopt relativism rather than skepticism, we may end up with conventionalism where what is true is just a matter of stipulation, i.e., we just decide which theories to adopt and can never do any comparing.
"It seems that even limited..." (p. 385)
¶ 53 | outline
Relativism holds that there are limits to what can be achieved rationally, while conventionalism holds that rationality can't achieve anything, which means that the progress of science might be explained in terms of, e.g., politics instead of a march toward truth.
"Conventionalism represent relativism taken ..." (p. 386)
¶ 54 | outline
"The debates concerning these..." (p. 386) MK don't attempt to settle these issues, and observe instead that these realism debates are the results of the OT distinction becoming less clear and more tenuous.
V. Observation Statements May Not be so Special
V. Section Summary
The supposed special status of observation statements as especially reliable may be threatened by (1) the relative reliability of detection statements, and (2) the fallibility of observation statements.
¶ 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
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¶ 55 | outline
Given that the OT distinction has failed so completely to achieve what it was supposed to, MK ask if the distinction is at all useful.
"We have seen that..." (p. 386)
¶ 56 | outline
Though the OT distinction has no bearing on what exists or the concept of truth, it may have something to say about knowledge, because, though observation statements are not certain, they still appear to be special or epistemically priveledged.
"First, now that we..." (p. 386)
¶ 57 | outline
What might be special about observation statements is that our observation reports could be more justified than our theoretical reports, which is expressed by epistemological instrumentalism (EI), the view that we can know about the observable realm but not the unobservable realm.
"What could this specialness..." (p. 387)
¶ 58 | outline
EIs differ from other instrumentalists in holding that statements about nonobservables are meaningful but it's just that can never know if they are true, e.g., genes and quarks may exist and so we can't sensibly talk about them, but we can never know if they do exist or not.
"Note the great difference" (p. 387)
¶ 59 | outline
MK don't evalutate the EI view but instead note that, while it does not require a strong or sharp OT distinction, it does require that observation statements are more justified than our theoretical statements because our theoretical statements are never justified.
"Again, it is not..." (p. 387)
¶ 60 | outline
No EI has given a convincing account of how to draw the distinction, so MK give it a try.
"Despite the above brand..." (p. 388)
¶ 61 | outline
MK advance the idea that we can call something observable if there is a reliable way of learning about it without measuring instruments, e.g., a ball's being red is observable if we can look at it and see the redness.
"We could try this..." (p. 388)
¶ 62 | outline
On this view, not everything is observable and there are things that may instead be detectable, e.g., the percentage of hemoglobin in a person's blood.
"From this it follows..." (p. 388)
¶ 63 | outline
Observation statments now look less special because detection is very often quite reliable, though since our measurement procedures depend on scientific theories, it is still possible that our basic theory of human physiological is wrong and that what we are detecting isn't hemoglobin, i.e., a specific oxygen-transporting protein. (This is the problem of underdetermination.)
"But, if this is..." (p. 388)
¶ 64 | outline
For EI to be a defensible view, our observation statements must be more reliable than our detection statements about, say, blood chemistry, i.e., observation statements must not fall prey to underdetermination.
"Perhaps the defenders of..." (p. 389)
¶ 65 | outline
MK simply assert that they aren't convinced that observation statements are immune to the problems that may plague detection statements.
"We are not completely..." (p. 389)
Conclusion
Click Down for paragraph summaries.
¶ 66 | outline
The OT distinction does not achieve what it set out to achieve.
"We are not completely..." (p. 389)
¶ 67 | outline
All the problems that supposedly plagued unobservables, e.g., how we can know they exist, now plague observables.
"(2) Given the breakdown..." (p. 389)
¶ 68 | outline
The OT distinction may be significant for highlighting that observation statements are more reliable than other kinds of statements, but no one has given a convincing argument that they won't have the same defects as, e.g., detection statements.
"(3) If there is any..." (p. 389)