PHI 030
May 18, 2015
Grover Maxwell
The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities
One paragraph at a time
Three Definitions
- Realism: The view that scientific claims about the world should be understood literally.
- Phenomenalism (an anti-realism): The view that all talk of physical objects can be translated into talk of sensations and experiences.
- Instrumentalism (also an anti-realism): The view that a scientific theory is to be regarded as an instrument for producing new predictions but not as itself capable of literal truth or falsity.
Three Examples
- Realism: The statement that "Cancer cells have multiplied inside of my pancreas" means that there literally are physical entities called cancer cells in my pancreas that are growing more numerous.
- Phenomenalism (an anti-realism): The statement that "I stubbed my toe on the chair" can be translated as "I experienced a sharp pain and then a dull ache in my foot (and a feeling of anger!)"
- Instrumentalism (also an anti-realism): The statement that "Electrons can pass through energy barriers even when they do not have enough energy to do so" is not literally true; it just means that we can predict the behavior of particles in certain systems.
Quantum Tunneling in 1 Minute
Starting with Maxwell's Conclusion
"Our drawing of the observational-theoretical line at any given point is an accident and a function of our physiological makeup, our current state of knowledge, and the instruments we happen to have available and, therefore, that it has no ontological significance whatever."
p. 372
Argument Structure
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Note: You can access this slide anytime by clicking the down arrow or swiping up on mobile devices. Give it a try.
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 1
Anti-realism is incompatible with the rational spirit of science, despite the fact that some hugely influential and pioneering physicists, such as Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, embrace it in the form of instrumentalism.
"That anyone today should..." (p. 363)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 2
Maxwell advances a radically realistic interpretation of theories and critiques the assumptions of the views he opposes.
"The literature on the..." (p. 363)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
The Problem
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 3
Maxwell notes that his essay is not comprehensive and introduces a faux-history as a way in to the problem.
"Although this essay is..." (p. 363)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 4
In this faux-history, which predates microscopes, a scientist named Jones explains the observable phenomenon of disease transmission via bodily contact in terms of in principle unobservable "bugs"—called 'crobes'—which allows him to develop a theory with testable predictions that can help prevent the spread of disease.
"In the days before..." (p. 364)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 5
Jones' convinces others to adopt methods to prevent the spread of the unobservable 'crobes', such as 'disinfecting' items using high heat, and this leads to a striking diminution of the death rate.
"After years of struggle..." (p. 364)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 6
Instrumentalists view Jones' crobe theory as containing convenient fictions that help produce the desired results—as effective instruments for doing science—but hold that statements containing these unobservable terms, e.g., "crobes transmit disease from human to human via skin contact," are meaningless because they don't refer to real things in the world.
"However, the 'crobes' (the..." (p. 364)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 7
Another view of Jones' theory is that any term for an unobservable can be completely translated into observation terms, which prevents the statements of the theory from being meaningless because they now only refer to real things in the world.
"According to another view..." (p. 365)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 8
Yet a third critique of Jones' theory is that even if his unobservable 'crobes' were real—which the previous two anti-realist views deny—such terms are unnecessary to science, which can be successful using only laws that refer to observables.
"Now virtually all who..." (p. 365)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 9
Maxwell adds that not all theoretical entities in science are similar to Jones' 'crobes'.
"Now, lest any reader..." (p. 365)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 10
When Jones' 'crobes' are observed with the advent of the microscope: (a) some philosophers adopt a realist position; (b) others adopt a subjective idealism or phenomenalism, which holds that any term for an unobservable entity can be translated into statements about human perceptual experience (W. T. Stace); (c) still others claim that the 'crobes' were not in fact in principle unobservable (Stephen Toulmin); (d) some take the radical view that 'crobes' still haven't been observed because seeing through a microscope lens is too indirect.
"Now Jones had the..." (p. 365-66)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Maxwell's Strategy from here on
Maxwell believes that (a)—realism—is the correct position. His plan is to show that the other options are bad, and he takes them in reverse order.
- (d) 'Crobes' haven't been observed
- (c) 'Crobes' were not in principle unobservable
- (b) Talk of 'crobes' can be translated into experience talk
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 11
Maxwell begins a critique of position (d), which holds that one does not see a real physical thing when looking through a microscope, but only a shadow or patch of color.
"Let us turn from..." (p. 366)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 12
If this view is correct, then we can't see real things through spectacles or window panes either, and the idea that an entity becomes a real physical thing when viewed directly and ceases to be one when view indirectly, e.g., through a microscope, gives an unacceptable ontology where what exists changes from context to context.
"I should like to..." (p. 366-67)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 13
Maxwell then dismisses, without argument, the suggestion that there is a significant difference between viewing entities through spectacles or binoculars as opposed to microscopes or telescopes.
"However, it might be..." (p. 367)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 14
Maxwell considers the objection that what is seen through a microscope is made visible via a scientific theory, whereas viewing a person on a stage requires no such addition, but he dismisses this as incompatible with an empiricism that demands a sharp observational-language/theoretical-language distinction.
"'But,' it might be..." (p. 367)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 15
Maxwell notes that molecules can be so small as to be unobservable, e.g., hydrogen, but also large enough to be directly perceived, e.g., diamonds, and if hydrogen is thus nonexistent while diamonds exist, then the scientific theory holds that molecules both exist and do not, and that some may exist more or less than others.
"Another argument for the..." (p. 367-68)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Status of the argument
(d) 'Crobes' haven't been observed- Explanation: This is crossed out because if 'crobes' haven't been observed, then neither has anything viewed through a window pane, and this is obviously unacceptable.
- (c) 'Crobes' were not in principle unobservable
- (b) Talk of 'crobes' can be translated into experience talk
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Unobservability in Principle (c)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 16
Maxwell begins a discussion of (c), which he characterizes as a view that entities are unobservable in principle if the facts of human physiology plus the scientific theory itself tells us that they are unobservable.
"Let us now consider..." (p. 368)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 17
But if our theory tells us what is observable and unobservable then we run into a contradiction.
"We should immediately note..." (p. 368)
(What contradiction?)
We want to know whether this statement is true:
"Electrons are unobservable."
- Maxwell's foes claim that sentences containing terms for unobservables, i.e., "theoretical expressions," are meaningless.
- The term electron is either a term for an unobservable, or it is not.
- If it is a term for an unobservable, then the sentence "Electrons are unobservable" is meaningless.
- If electron is an observation term, then the statement "Electrons are unobservable" is meaningful.
- However, the sentence asserts that 'electron' is not an observation term, which contradicts (2)
- So, asking whether electrons are unobservable is either meaningless or contradictory.
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Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 18
Ignoring that, Maxwell examines the idea of unobservability in principle by considering the electron and concludes that there is no "logical or conceptual absurdity" in thinking that we might one day observe one, however improbable that might be.
"But, assuming that well-formed..." (p. 368-69)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 19
The ability to observe unobservables might be achieved via a mutation in humans.
"Consider a somewhat less..." (p. 369)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 20
Maxwell makes clear he is not advancing claims or predictions about what science will and will not observe, but rather is showing that if theories tell us what is observable, then there are no philosophical criteria for separating observable from unobservable because it is always possible to talk about observing some entity in a theory without thereby committing a logical error.
"Now I think that..." (p. 369)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 21
Maxwell considers the suggestion that we should not speak of observable but instead of observed.
"There is another line..." (p. 369)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 22
On this view, observation languages, which contain only terms for ordinary physical objects, must only talk about items that have been observed, but if this view is taken too seriously, then we get weird results, e.g., if you have never met your grandmother, then you cannot refer to her in your observation language.
"Again, let us consider..." (p. 369-70)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 23
And the suggestion that observation terms must instead refer to kinds of things, e.g., human beings instead of my grandmother, does not help because we can find examples of things no one will ever observe, e.g., a 14-foot-tall man, and we don't want to say that descriptions of these non-existent things don't contain observation terms.
"Perhaps it is intended..." (p. 370)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Status of the argument
(d) 'Crobes' haven't been observed- Explanation: This is crossed out because if 'crobes' haven't been observed, then neither has anything viewed through a window pane, and this is obviously unacceptable.
(c) 'Crobes' were not in principle unobservable- Explanation: This is crossed out because Maxwell believes he has shown that our scientific theories cannot draw a definitive line between observable and unobservable.
- (b) Talk of 'crobes' can be translated into experience talk
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Phenomenalism (b)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 24
Maxwell turns to phenomenalism (b), which he takes to be largely discredited as an option, and he makes the point that whatever phenomenalists say about theoretical entities, they also say about observable physical objects, which shows their criticism to be rather toothless.
"Now it is not..." (p. 370)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 25
Maxwell digresses, acknowledging that the observation base, i.e., the non-theoretical part of the language, is very important, but instead of placing importance on the idea of observational term, he invokes the idea of a quickly decidable sentence, and casts observation term as a "term which may occur in a quickly decidable sentence."
"Nevertheless, a few considerations..." (p. 370-71)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 26
Maxwell agrees with phenomenalists that there are such things as sense contents, but holds that our language typically does not refer to these sense contents but instead to objects in the world, a claim that Maxwell think is bolstered by the fact that when we recall events in quickly decidable sentences, we do so in terms of objects rather than sense data, i.e., colors, shapes, etc.
"Returning to phenomenalism, let..." (p. 371)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 27
The question of how we can quickly decide the truth or falsity of observation sentences and what role sense contents play in the process is an empirical question, which means phenomenalists can't establish their point by mere argument.
"Two questions naturally arise..." (p. 371)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 28
Additionally, we can learn to directly observe what were formerly theoretical entities, which further troubles the supposed dividing line between observational and theoretical.
"It is interesting and..." (p. 371-72)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
¶ 29
Thus, anti-realist arguments are defeated since there are no principled criteria for dividing observable and unobservable, and any criteria that are invoked have no bearing on what exists in the world.
"I conclude that our..." (p. 372)
Introduction
¶ 1, 2
The Problem
¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
The Observational-Theoretical Dichotomy (d)
¶ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Unobservability in principle (c)
¶ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Phenomenalism (b)
¶ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Status of the argument
(d) 'Crobes' haven't been observed- Explanation: This is crossed out because if 'crobes' haven't been observed, then neither has anything viewed through a window pane.
(c) 'Crobes' were not in principle unobservable- Explanation: This is crossed out because Maxwell believes he has shown that our scientific theories cannot draw a definitive line between observable and unobservable.
(b) Talk of 'crobes' can be translated into experience talk- Explanation: This is crossed out because even experience talk is better put in terms of objects than in terms of sensations.